Using a semistructural approach based on a dynamic monopsony model, we examine to what extent workers performing different job tasks are exposed to different degrees of monopsony power and whether these differences in monopsony power have changed over the last 30 years. We find that workers performing mostly nonroutine cognitive tasks are exposed to a higher degree of monopsony power than workers performing routine or nonroutine manual tasks. Job-specific human capital and nonpecuniary job characteristics are the most likely explanations for this result. We find no evidence that labor market polarization has increased monopsony power over time.

We examine how changes in task content over time condition occupational wage development. Using survey data from Germany, we document substantial heterogeneity in within-occupational changes in task content. Combining this evidence with administrative data on individual employment outcomes over a 25-year period, we find important heterogeneity in wage penalties amongst jobs that were initially routine task intensive. While occupations that remain (relatively) routine intensive generate substantial wage penalties, occupations with a decreasing routine intensity experience stable or even increasing wages. These findings suggest that changing task profiles of occupations are an important adaptation mechanism to technological change. They cannot be explained by composition or cohort effects.

We study firms' beliefs about the wage distribution using a large-scale survey of managers in Germany linked to administrative data. 80% of managers believe their firm pays at least the median wage. Comparing beliefs to administrative wage data, we document pervasive and asymmetric misperceptions: most managers overestimate their firm's relative wage and underestimate their workers' outside options. Beliefs are related to firm outcomes: firms with inaccurate beliefs experience higher separation rates, slower employment growth, and recruit lower-ability workers. The most-biased managers are also the most confident in their beliefs, and providing information about wages does not shift managerial beliefs.

This paper analyzes the horizontal spillover effects of Germany’s first sectoral minimum wage. Using linked employer-employee administrative data and a difference-in-differences design, I examine how the public announcement and introduction of the minimum wage affected sub-minimum wage workers in related jobs outside the covered sector. I define the related jobs using employment flows and find an increase in wages and job-to-job transitions for sub-minimum wage workers in these jobs, beginning precisely in the month of the public announcement. These spillover effects were driven by workers who reallocated to higher-paying establishments.

Professional networks can ease labor market entry, yet college students have few opportunities to build them. Student jobs offer one such opportunity. We study whether the quality of the coworker networks students form in these jobs affects their transition into the labor market. We use German administrative data that link university records to students’ employment histories before and after graduation and to their coworkers during student employment. We measure network quality by former coworkers’ earnings at the time of the student’s graduation. To address selection into student jobs, we condition on firm-by-occupation fixed effects and control for a rich set of individual characteristics. A 10 percent increase in former coworkers’ average earnings raises graduates’ wages in their first job by about 1 percent. Evidence on job search behavior points to coworker referrals as the main mechanism.